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ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION’S POPULARITY 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
The purpose this dissertation is to test the impact of macroeconomic outcomes on 
citizens’ support for the European integration process. Citizens’ support is vital for the 
European integration process mainly because without their support, national 
governments’ will not endorse increases in the levels of integration. In order to analyse 
the impact of the economic conditions on the European Union’s popularity at an 
aggregate level, a popularity function was estimated for a panel of the first fifteen EU 
members, between 1974 and 2008. To control for countries’ different characteristics at 
different levels, a fixed effects estimation method was used. 
The results indicate a negative impact of unemployment variations on EU’s citizen 
support for the EU, and a positive impact of the degree of openness of the economies 
and of the percentage of trade with other EU countries. There is also evidence of the 
existence of a honeymoon effect in the first three years of each countries EU 
membership, and of a decrease in citizens’ support for the EU as time in the Union 
increases. When the sample is split into different integration stages, econometric results 
suggest that significant departures of the economic variables from what citizens 
consider to be ‘acceptable’ levels increase the weight citizens attribute to them in their 
evaluations of the EU’s performance. 
These results can have important implications on the EU’s policies since they reveal 
which variables the EU should focus on when it considers increasing its integration 
levels. 
 
Keywords: European Union, popularity, economic performance, panel-data 
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DETERMINANTES ECONÓMICOS DA POPULARIDADE DA UNIÃO 
EUROPEIA 
 
 
 
Resumo 
 
 
O objectivo desta dissertação é analisar o impacto da performance económica de cada 
país na opinião dos seus cidadãos sobre o processo de integração europeia. O apoio dos 
cidadãos é vital para o processo de integração europeia principalmente porque sem ele 
os governos nacionais não endossarão aumentos nos níveis de integração europeia. De 
modo a analisar o impacto das condições económicas na popularidade da União 
Europeia (UE) a um nível agregado, foi estimada uma função popularidade para um 
painel composto pelos quinze primeiros membros da UE, entre 1974 e 2008. Para 
controlar para as diferentes características dos países aos mais diversos níveis, foi usado 
um método de estimação de efeitos fixos. 
Os resultados indicam um impacto negativo das variações do desemprego na opinião 
dos cidadãos sobre a UE, e um impacto positivo do nível de abertura da economia e da 
percentagem de comércio realizada com outros países da UE. Existe também evidência 
da existência de um efeito lua-de-mel nos primeiros três anos após a entrada de cada 
país na UE, e de uma diminuição da popularidade da UE em cada país ao longo do 
tempo. Quando a amostra é dividida em diferentes fases de integração, os resultados 
econométricos sugerem que desvios significativos de uma variável económica daquilo 
que os cidadãos consideram valores ‘aceitáveis’ aumentam o peso que os indivíduos 
lhes atribuem nas suas avaliações da performance da UE. 
Estes resultados podem ter implicações importantes nas políticas da UE dado que 
revelam em que variáveis a UE se deve concentrar quando considerar aumentar os seus 
níveis de integração. 
 
 
Palavras-chave: União Europeia, popularidade, performance económica, dados em 
painel 
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1. Introduction 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the impact of economic conditions on 
European Union’s (EU) popularity. Public support is vital for the European integration 
process. National governments will not decide to move forward to higher levels of 
integration within the EU’s scope if they believe citizens don’t support it, especially if 
this decision reduces their chances of re-election. Therefore, in order for the EU to 
continue its integration process, it is important to understand the determinants of 
citizens’ support for it. 
In little more than half a century of existence, the EU has become one of the most 
advanced processes of international economic and political integration in the world. It 
started as a common market for a few selected products, with only six countries1, 
aiming at guaranteeing peace in the days that followed the end Second World War, but 
the European integration process led the EU to become a political and economic union 
that encompasses twenty seven countries and close to 500 million citizens, with its own 
directly elected parliament, its own budget and its own constitution. The European 
integration process was slow and progressive, and it was lead by treaties that 
represented steps towards higher levels of integration, such as the Single European Act 
(1986) or the Treaty of the European Union (1991). But as the EU was changing during 
the second half of the twentieth century, so was its economy. 
After the Second World War ended, up until the end of the sixties, most developed 
European countries had low levels of inflation, stable and relatively low unemployment 
rates and healthy GDP growth rates, but it all began to change after 1970. The two oil 
crises, one in the beginning of the decade and the other in the end, shook the world’s 
economy, leading to high levels of inflation together with high levels of unemployment 
and much smaller GDP growth rates, significantly changing the economic outlook of 
western economies. Although inflation returned to lower levels after the two oil shocks, 
unemployment rates persisted at levels higher than those observed before the two oil 
crises. This wasn’t an easy environment for economic policymakers to deal with. As 
economic paradigms changed and unforeseen economic scenarios became true, 
policymaking decision became even more difficult than before. If it was rather clear that 
the classic economical tools previously used to fight adverse economic conditions 
weren’t useful in the new scenario, the new path to follow wasn’t consensual. If we take 
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 Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and Netherlands. 
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a closer look at the economic measures taken by governments in the UK, the USA or 
France at that time, we conclude that there were profound differences in the way each 
country tackled relatively similar problems, even though some governments were 
ideologically close. 
During the same period, the increasing levels of integration of the EU inherently 
reduced the degrees of freedom in economic policymaking. This was visible even in 
countries that were not EU members at the time, but wanted to join the EU. Although 
they were not legally bounded to the EU’s policies and recommendations, they had to 
follow them closely in order to assure they would be accepted as members in the future.  
Taking into consideration the transfer of powers in the economic field from the 
national governments to the EU’s supranational entities – with the adoption of a 
common currency as the its most emblematic and visible feature –  it is reasonable to 
assume that the EU is in part responsible for each state member’s economic outcomes. 
Therefore, it is expectable that the economic performances of each country influence 
citizens’ opinions about the EU and their support for the European integration process. 
The idea that economic performance may have a significant impact on EU’s 
popularity is closely related to the political business cycle (PBC) literature’s hypothesis 
that economic outcomes have a significant impact on elections’ results. If governments 
are held responsible for economic outcomes, then when economies are prospering the 
governments are rewarded with more votes in the following elections, and the reverse 
happens when economic conditions are less favourable to the electorate. Given that the 
European integration process implies a transfer of powers from national governments to 
the EU, it is expectable that the EU would also be accounted responsible for the 
economic conditions of each country. Moreover, as integration increases over time, it is 
plausible for citizens to understand economic outcomes more as a result of the EU’s 
decisions than as an outcome of their governments’ actions.  
At this stage, it is important to stress the parallelism between vote/popularity (VP) 
functions, the PBC literature and the purpose of my thesis. The PBC literature is more 
prolific when it comes to vote functions than it is on popularity functions. This can be 
due to the fact that popularity functions are seen, in part, as an alternative to vote 
functions that allow researchers to use larger datasets to assess government’s popularity, 
since elections in most countries are held only one time every four or five years. 
Although elections’ outcomes are the ultimate and more precise way to assess public’s 
opinion about their government, some small sample issues may arise on vote functions 
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due to the small number of observations available. In this case, the choice for a 
popularity function to study the determinants of the support for the European integration 
process comes from the fact that EU citizens are still today far away from fully 
identifying themselves with the EU in the same way they do with their nations. 
Accordingly, they use European Parliament elections mainly as a way to signal their 
support or lack of it for their national governments, making them second order 
elections, as shown by Reif and Schmitt (1980), Reif (1984), Marsh (1998) and Kousser 
(2004). Therefore, European Parliament elections’ results would be a poor measure of 
the EU’s popularity. In spite of the fact that the use of a popularity function greatly 
increases my observations and this can be a valuable asset to my research, it is 
important to stress that it is not the main reason behind my decision. 
As far I am aware of, this is the first study on the economic determinants of the 
support for the European integration process with such a large sample. I will use data 
between 1974 and 2008, for the first fifteen EU Members2. Although some authors like 
Eichenberg and Dalton (1993), Anderson and Kaltenthaler (1996) or Mahler, Taylor and 
Wozniak (2000) have already analysed the impact of macroeconomic outcomes on the 
support for the EU, their samples are much smaller, both in the number of periods and 
the number of countries. The study with a larger sample that I am aware of has 152 
observations, while my baseline model has 530 observations.  
The structure of this dissertation is as follows: Section 2 will present the most 
relevant literature regarding the VP-functions, Political Business Cycle, the support for 
the European integration process, as well as a description of the EU’s history and its 
current structure; Section 3 presents the data used and the respective sources; Section 4 
will explain the empirical and econometric approach and present the estimations’ 
results; Section 5 finishes off up the dissertation with the most important conclusions 
and work yet to be done. 
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 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
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2. Literature Review 
2.1 Economics and Elections 
Vote and popularity functions were first introduced to the economic science in the 
early seventies. The first popularity function was formulated by Mueller (1970) in his 
analysis of the United States President’s popularity using data from monthly polls 
around the country. Kramer (1971) came up with the first vote function, when he 
studied the impact of economic conditions on US Congress’ elections outcomes. 
Around the same time, Goodhart and Bhansali (1970) also came up with a popularity 
function for the UK Prime Minister. As in Mueller (1970), they also used monthly polls 
to access Prime Minister’s popularity. Regardless of the different approaches taken by 
each of these authors, they all mentioned Downs (1957) seminal book as the theoretical 
basis for their work. 
Following these pioneering works, several other economists developed new models 
to explain voters’ behaviour more accurately. The starting premise was both simple and 
compelling: since governments are held responsible for their countries’ economic 
performances, their popularity and results at elections should be influenced by them. 
Even though the PBC literature is extensive, there is still much discussion about the role 
economics plays in election outcomes and in governments’ popularity. Some believe 
that the economy influences voting decisions in ways that allow the governments to take 
advantage of them, manipulating the economy in pre-election periods to increase their 
chances of re-election – opportunistic PBC. Others believe that economic voting leads 
to business cycles due to the differences in ideologies between the competing parties – 
partisan PBC. There are also disagreements over several aspects of individual decisions, 
and over which variables to use in order to measure economic voting. In the following 
sections I will take a look at the different streams of PBC literature and its main 
controversies.  
 
2.1.1 Opportunistic Political Business Cycles 
One stream of literature on PBC literature argues that macroeconomic outcomes 
around election time are manipulated by incumbents in order to increase their chances 
of re-election. These authors based most of their work on Nordhaus’ (1975) theoretical 
model of the political business cycle that studies governments’ optimal choices along a 
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Philips Curve. The model is solved both for the long run and the short run. Relying on 
voters being myopic and homogeneous, the author shows that it is optimal for 
governments to induce a business cycle in the short run through their policy making 
decisions. This would lead to low levels of unemployment before elections, followed by 
higher levels of inflation. After elections, the winner would then let unemployment rise 
in order to fight the previous burst of inflation. Works by authors like Fair (1978) 
confirm that high real GDP per capita growth rates and lower unemployment rates 
before elections significantly increase incumbents’ chances of re-election. 
Nordhaus’ model was criticized because it relied on the hypothesis of adaptative 
expectations. If voters were fully rational and, in presence of complete information, they 
would understand the costs associated with the expansionary policies before elections. 
Therefore, they would not vote for the incumbent party since they would realize that the 
adoption of opportunistic policies worsened their well being after elections. This means 
that policies intended to increase incumbents’ votes before the elections could, in some 
cases, lead to a decrease in votes. But if voters behaved like that and governments were 
aware of it beforehand, they would have no incentive to induce a business cycle in the 
first place. 
Another important critique made to the early opportunistic PBC models is that they 
assume that monetary policy is in the hands of governments. This assumption is 
particularly relevant in this thesis since it focuses its analysis on the first fifteen EU 
members and most of them already gave away the control of monetary policy over to 
the European Central Bank (ECB). Without control over monetary policy, national 
governments are less able to manipulate aggregate demand, and therefore to induce a 
PBC. It is however possible to argue that fiscal policy can also be used as a tool to 
generate such cycles.  
Given the mentioned critiques, it seems complicated to conceptually accept a model 
that encompasses both opportunistic business cycles and fully rational voters at the 
same time. 
In the wake of all this criticism, Rogoff and Sibert (1988) came up with the first of 
several rational opportunistic PBC models, like those by Rogoff (1990) and Persson and 
Tabelini (1990). According to these models, different parties have different levels of 
competence. In Rogoff and Sibert’s (1988) model, each candidate has different costs to 
finance the same levels of expenditure. In a context of asymmetric information, a 
competent incumbent has an incentive to signal its competence. Even though he might 
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be giving a false signal, or at least an exaggerated one, voters know that such signal 
could not be given by a less competent incumbent. Therefore, although the increase in 
public expenditure before elections will imply higher seignorage taxes afterwards, 
voters will still be better off by voting in the incumbent if the signal received makes 
them believe he is the most competent candidate. This would basically mean that he is 
the candidate that would need less tax revenue to finance the same level of expenditure. 
This model formulation allows the co-existence of opportunistic political business 
cycles and fully rational voters, thus leading to the possibility of voters rationally 
responding in a positive way to governments’ expansionary policies before election 
time, even at the cost of future taxes. As for Persson and Tabelini’s (1990) model, it 
defines incumbents’ competence as their ability to promote economic growth without 
inflation. 
The opportunistic PBC line of reasoning assumes that voters’ preferences are 
homogeneous and that incumbents are all alike, because they all want to be re-elected. 
There is however large evidence that a significant part of the electorate exhibits strong 
loyalty to certain parties and that this loyalty is reciprocal. That is, parties stick to ideals 
and adapt policies that are favourable to those who systematically vote on them. In fact, 
at election times, different parties make different promises. If voters were 
homogeneous, as the opportunistic PBC models suggest, then all parties would 
converge to the same policy promises, if their main goal was to win the elections. This 
takes us to an alternative stream of research, parallel to that of the opportunistic PBC: 
the partisan PBC models. 
  
2.1.2 Partisan Political Business Cycles 
The partisan PBC line of thought argued that the motivation behind policy making 
decisions that induced PBC was not governments’ opportunistic nature, but differences 
in parties’ ideologies. The main question, as Drazen (2000) puts it, is then “whether 
alternation of parties with different preferred policies can lead to a cycle when voters 
are rational”. This view assumes that voters have different preferences for the 
competing parties, regardless of past or future economic conditions. For instance, some 
part of the population, like blue collar workers, can feel more threatened by 
unemployment perspectives, while wealthier groups might feel that inflation is more 
likely to become a menace to their income. While voters more concerned about 
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unemployment will be expected to support parties that have a greater concern about it – 
usually left wing parties -, voters who care more about inflation will probably support 
those parties more concentrated on fighting inflation – mostly right wing parties. This 
hypothesis is supported by studies such as Tufte (1978) and Hibbs (1982) that find 
consistent results supporting the idea that different occupational groups tend to care 
more about different economic variables. This in turn has a significant impact on their 
assessment of national economic conditions, as well as on the candidates they decide to 
support. 
Hibbs (1977) conceptualizes the first partisan political business cycle model inspired 
by the different preferences regarding inflation and unemployment between republicans 
and democrats in the US. This dichotomy can easily be extended to any left/right wing 
parties in other countries. The main result of Hibbs’ model is a business cycle generated 
by party rotation in office, with higher unemployment and lower inflation when the 
government is lead by a right wing party, and lower unemployment with higher levels 
of inflation when the government is lead by a left wing party. The different 
combinations of inflation and unemployment are chosen along either an expectations-
adjusted Philips Curve with adaptive expectations or a Philips Curve with a trade-off 
between unemployment and anticipated inflation. The latter shows rather clearly one of 
the basic failures of this type of models: much like the opportunistic PBC models, 
partisan PBC models also assume that voters constantly make mistakes while forming 
their expectations. 
In an attempt to integrate opportunistic and ideological behaviour, Frey and 
Schneider (1978) propose a “mixed” model, where governments act as it is assumed in 
the partisan PBC framework, but only as far as it doesn’t harm their chances of re-
election. When the incumbents’ chances of re-election become dangerously small, then 
the governments’ policies will be lead by an opportunistic behaviour, as postulated by 
the opportunistic PBC literature. The authors find evidence of both kinds of behaviours 
depending on the incumbents’ confidence on the election outcome, as predicted by the 
model. 
A different alternative to support the partisan PBC framework and surpass the 
critique to Hibbs’ (1977) model that voters make systematic mistakes, was proposed by 
Alesina (1987, 1988). In these two papers, the author presented a partisan PBC model 
with rational expectations, where business cycles are generated by uncertainty about 
elections’ outcome, combined with differences in parties’ ideologies. The model 
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assumes elections happen every other year. Alesina argues that negotiations on nominal 
wages take into account expectations about inflation. Unexpected levels of inflation 
have real effects as long as contracts are not signed every period, as assumed in the 
model. Voters’ expectations about inflation depend on the ideology of the next 
government. Since contracts are negotiated before election time, individuals have to 
guess who is going to be in office after the next election. They, therefore, associate a 
probability of winning to each party and, given each party’s different optimal policy and 
probability of winning, make their predictions about future inflation. The higher the 
difference between agents’ predictions about elections’ outcome and the actual 
outcome, the higher the partisan effect will be. But if the election outcome is certain, 
expected inflation will meet actual inflation and there will be no business cycle.  This 
microeconomic structure allows for a partisan PBC with rational agents. A recession is 
expected when the winning party is a right wing party (Republican for the US), and an 
expansion if the winner is a left wing party (Democrat for the US). The expected 
inflation will stand somewhere between the right wing preferred inflation level and the 
left wing party desired inflation level. The effect disappears in the second period and 
output growth should be approximately the same under either type of administration, 
only with higher inflation under a left wing government. The model also concludes that 
if the contending parties could reach an agreement there would be no unemployment 
variations, thus making the voters better off. The values of such a consensus would 
depend on the probability of election of each candidate, treated as exogenous in the 
model. But it is not very likely that, once in office, the winning party would have any 
incentive to honour such an agreement. One possibility to solve this drawback would be 
to have an independent institution controlling inflation rates, like a central bank. 
Yet another alternative intended to overcome early criticism of partisan PBC was 
proposed by Hibbs (1994) through a “model of changing objectives”. Again, elections 
happen every other year. Similarly to Alesina’s (1987), this model also presents larger 
differences between different parties’ policies in the first year after the election when 
compared to the second. In this case however, the differences are not due to uncertainty 
about the election outcome but a result of uncertainty about the way the economy 
works. This leads to uncertainty about the fit of each economic policy to pursue the 
intended goals. Conceptually, each candidate estimates the natural unemployment rate, 
and the gap between their estimation and the actual value of the natural unemployment 
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rate (which they can observe only if they win the election) and the parties underlying 
preferences will generate the business cycle. 
 
2.1.3 Voters’ Behaviour 
Although it is consensual that economic conditions play a role in citizens’ voting 
decisions, the nature of such relationship is still subject to much debate – good reviews 
of the literature can be found in Nannestad and Paldam (1994), Lewis-Beck and 
Stegmaier (2000) and Hibbs (2006). 
 
 
2.1.3.1 Sociotropic or Egotropic? 
One of the controversial points in PBC literature concerns voters’ view of the 
economy. If voters’ perception of national economic conditions is based on their 
households’ financial situation, they are said to be egotropic. If, on the contrary, voters 
look at a broader perspective of the economy, showing concern not only about their 
personal situation but also about that of their peers’, voters are said to be sociotropic. 
Empirical results have mostly supported voters as being sociotropic, with the 
conclusions by Kinder and Kiewiet (1979) being particularly supportive of this view, on 
what came to be known as the “Kinder and Kiewiet result” – the absence of egotropic 
voting and the presence of strong sociotropic voting. Their results were afterwards 
confirmed by larger and different data sets. Even though some researchers find an 
egotropic component on economic voting they always find a significant sociotropic 
component too. It is, therefore, fair to conclude that the proof for sociotropic voting is 
very strong while evidence of egotropic voting is scarcer and significantly weaker, 
when one considers the political business cycle literature as a whole. 
 
2.1.3.2 Retrospective or Prospective Voting? 
The first and more prominent critiques of both the opportunistic and the partisan 
PBC models focused on the assumption of voters’ purely retrospective behaviour. 
According to the critics, individuals are rational enough to know that their votes do 
more than evaluate past performance: they define future policies. Therefore, voters 
should also focus on what they expect for the future from each party in case of victory 
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in the elections, instead of concentrating only on what happened in the past.  
Retrospective voters define their economic vote based purely on past economic 
performance, and according to the critiques this is not a rational behaviour since it may 
ignore important information about future economic policy. For instance, it wouldn’t be 
logical for a voter to punish a government for a bad economic period if there is strong 
suspicion that the opponent party in the elections won’t be able to do any better than the 
incumbent did. The prospective nature of voting was postulated by Downs, for most 
researchers the theoretical starting point for all the PBC literature. Nonetheless, 
retrospective voting is not necessarily a signal of a somewhat irrational behaviour. 
Ferejohn (1986) defines a model where retrospective voting is not only rational but 
optimal. Fiorina (1981) followed a similar path to conclude that retrospective voting can 
really be a rational choice. 
In the end, one should probably consider the possibility that voting has both a 
retrospective and a prospective side. Going back to Downs work, he actually defended 
that voters use past economic performance to make their predictions about future 
economic policies and outcomes. In this context voters are forward looking (i.e 
prospective) but always keep an eye on the past. Past events may not be the only 
fundaments for the formation of individuals’ expectations, as Lewis-Beck (1988) 
demonstrates, but they are probably an important part of it. 
Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and Rogoff (1990) “signalling models” originated the first 
setup of what could be called “rational retrospection”. However, empirical studies of 
models such as Alesina, Londegran and Rosenthal (1993) or Alesina and Rosenthal 
(1995) still found significant proof of naïve retrospective voting. Veiga and Veiga 
(2004a), in their study on the determinants of vote intentions in Portugal between 1986 
and 2001, also found strong evidence that voters are retrospective. Moreover, Hibbs 
(2000) too found evidence of pure retrospective vote in his “Peace and Bread Model” 
too. Therefore, we may conclude that there is strong support for Key’s (1966) argument 
about the retrospective nature of voting. 
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2.1.3.3 Are voters myopic? 
Another issue that still raises significant debate and disagreement across the PBC 
literature is how far back in time voters look when they make their assessments of the 
state of the economy. On one hand, authors like Fair (1978), Paldam and Nannestad 
(2000) or Veiga (1998) find voters to be myopic, only looking back to the more recent 
values of variables such as inflation, unemployment rate or GDP growth, when they 
form their opinions about the state of the economy. On the other hand, we have authors 
like Pletzman (1990) or Hibbs (2000), who state that the economic performance during 
the whole electoral cycle is taken into consideration by voters when they assess their 
country’s economic performance. 
With all this being said, it isn’t clear what kind of lag structure a model aimed to 
understand the origin and magnitude of the economic vote should have. Nonetheless, as 
in most of the issues regarding the PBC literature, the most accurate answer will 
probably lie somewhere between the two more extreme views. In this particular issue, it 
is likely that voters are not as myopic as to only consider last year’s economic 
performance to assess incumbent’s competence in handling the economy, but myopic 
enough to give more weight to more recent data while making that evaluation than  to 
data from the beginning of the electoral cycle. 
 
2.1.4 The state of the art 
The most recent research on the political business cycles has diverged into two main 
different approaches: The first faces the issue at an individual (i.e micro) level, with 
models of higher complexity, like the two stage models of Dutch and Stevenson (2008) 
and Brug, Eijk and Franklin (2007).  In those models, the authors control for a 
significant number of contextual variables, in both stages, in order to purge most of the 
instability found across the preceding PBC literature. The second approach takes a 
global view at voting decisions, looking at macroeconomic variables and election 
outcomes, like the works by Hibbs (2000) or Chappell and Veiga (2000). Veiga and 
Veiga (2004b) also take an aggregate approach to the determinants of popularity for 
different political entities in Portugal, finding proof consistent with the 
responsabilization hypothesis, with unemployment playing being particularly 
determinant on those entities popularity. 
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Since this thesis will take an aggregate view of the economy, the first stream of 
research, with all its merits and contributions to our knowledge of the nature and the 
mechanisms of individuals’ voting decisions, shall not be thoroughly analyzed. Some 
insights can and will be used if they are relevant to the research in hands, but at this 
stage it is important to focus on models that resemble in a closer way the model to be 
developed. 
Hibbs (2000) and its “Peace and Bread Model” can be pointed out as one of the 
most important contributions for the PBC literature in the US economy of the last 
decade. Hibbs showed that when the model accounts for the existence of “war years” 
(i.e years when the USA is involved in war), the weighted-average growth of real 
disposable personal income per capita explains almost all of election outcome’s 
variations in “non-war years”. In “war years”, the number of American military 
casualties in action, together with the same economic variable, still accounts for most of 
election outcome’s variations. One of the biggest surprises of the paper’s results is that 
none of the additional variables tested added anything valuable to the model.  
In a closer approach to what I intend to do in my thesis, Chappell and Veiga (2000) 
analyzed a panel of 13 Western countries’ electoral outcomes for almost forty years, 
using different alternatives to measure economic performance, each one corresponding 
to different economic paradigms. They found out that only inflation is consistently 
significant on individuals’ voting decisions. Other macroeconomic variables, such as 
real output growth rate, don’t seem to significantly influence citizens’ voting decisions. 
The authors argue that this can be a consequence of voters perceiving economic growth, 
and other real economic variables, as variables that are harder to influence by their 
governments when compared to inflation, therefore not accounting governments 
responsible for their fluctuations.  
 
2.2 The European Integration Process 
In order to fully understand the evolution of the European integration process and its 
implications on the EU’s popularity over time, it is essential to acknowledge the 
motivations that drove it in the first place. Although political reasons are behind most 
cases of international economic integration, they also bring some important economic 
benefits, namely: 
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• Enhanced productivity, given that higher levels of competition lead to 
increased specialization, and this, in turn, according to the comparative advantage 
theory, enhances productivity. 
• If the community negotiates as an unit, it assumes a stronger international 
position regarding trading agreements 
• Larger markets allow producers to take more advantage of economies of scale; 
• Policy coordination allows for common targets, such as full unemployment or 
stable economic growth, to be pursued at the same pace by all countries involved. 
 
These are all potential gains. A successful economic integration is one that takes 
advantage of all of those potential gains, or at least of most of them. 
From the first days of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), in 1952, to 
the current days, the European integration process has come a long way. Except for the 
most visionary minds, at the beginning most wouldn’t believe that, what was first 
intended to be a cooperation platform to ensure peace between former enemies in the 
Second World War would eventually become one of the most advanced and ambitious 
project of international political and economic integration in the world. Figure 1 
presents a timeline with the major historic events in the EU’s history. 
 
Figure 1 – EU’s History Timeline 
Year 1951 1957 1973 1981 1986 1993 1995 1996 1999 2004 2007 
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The following sections present a brief description of the different integration phases 
in the EU history since its formation as the European Economic Community (EEC). A 
more detailed and complete history of the EU can be found in Artis and Nixson (2001). 
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2.2.1 The early days of the European Economic Community  
The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), established in the Treaty of 
Paris, in 1951, took the first step into the European integration process, by setting up a 
common market for coal and steel. It comprised of only six countries at its beginning: 
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and Luxembourg. The success of the ECSC project 
can be explained by the fact that its concept encompassed both economic and political 
advantages to its members: if, on one hand, it allowed for a joint effort to reconvert the 
war industries into productive activities, on the other hand this effort made it impossible 
for France and Germany to go to war against each other again since they couldn’t 
produce weapons without the other members’ knowledge and permission. The ECSC 
was also a pioneer in nominating a supranational entity to manage all matters within its 
sphere of intervention.  
The European Economic Community (EEC) was established by through the Treaty 
of Rome in 1957. During its first decade and half of its existence, the community 
followed the path of integration through the creation of a common market for goods and 
services, as well as through the definition of common policies in such important 
economic areas as agriculture and trade. Interstate tariffs were all removed before the 1st 
July 1968. In the end, the EEC was a less supranational entity than the ECSC, which 
was required to avoid further political controversies that could eventually endanger the 
creation of the community.  Nonetheless, this was a small price to pay for a more 
ambitious venture, given that integrating the whole economy came out to be more 
complicated and uncertain than integrating only a specific sector.  
The decision making process of the community was supported by the different 
institutions that were created along with it: the Council of Ministers, the European 
Commission (EC), the European Parliament (EP) and the Court of Justice. 
The following decade also presented several small steps towards a higher degree of 
economic and political integration, from including environmental problems in the EEC 
agenda to the establishment of direct elections to the European Parliament. The 
seventies also saw the first enlargement of the EEC, with the entries of Denmark, 
Ireland and the United Kingdom in 1973. In 1974, the EEC created the European 
Council, in order to bring country leaders closer to the decision making process of the 
community. This allowed the EEC to finally overcome the impasse brought by the 
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Common Agricultural Policy (PAC).  In 1981 Greece joined the community, raising the 
number of members to 10. 
 
2.2.2 The Single European Act - 1986 
The Single European Act (SEA), signed in 1986 to come into effect on July 1st 
1987, was undoubtedly a giant leap in the European integration process. After the two 
oil crises of the 70’s and the consequent recessions, consensus was reached between the 
EEC members on the direction and pace at which the community should be moving, as 
well as on the urgency to put such consensus to fruition as soon as possible. In the 
eighties, the EEC’s economy was still not even close to the performances of global 
competitors like the USA or Japan. It was clear that the EEC’s economy needed to have 
a more flexible and liberalized market in order to compete as a global power in the 
world economy, which was ultimately its members’ main ambition.  
Among the most important SEA contributions were the commitment to complete the 
single market until the end of 1992, and the agreement to raise the integration of 
decision making processes across state members. The years preceding the SEA also 
made clear that the changing political international environment asked for the EEC 
members’ external policies to converge into a unitary front, in order for the community 
to be an important player in the new international scheme. 
1986 was also the year when Portugal and Spain joined the EEC, further extending 
the community to the South European, less developed countries. 
With the decisions of the SEA in motion, the idea of an European Monetary Union 
(EMU) gaining momentum after the publishing of the Delors Report, and the political, 
economic and social repercussions of the Berlin Wall’s fall being felt all over the EEC 
territories (the reunification of Germany originated the only enlargement without formal 
accession in the EEC’s history), the negotiations for the Treaty of European Union 
(TEU) proceeded rather quickly. 
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2.2.3 The Treaty of the European Union – 1991 
The TEU was signed in Maastricht in December 1991, and came into effect after 
November 1993. The main driving forces behind the idea of the TEU mentioned before 
were soon followed by a whole new set of intentions by the state members, aiming to 
raise the bar not only in terms of economic integration, but also in fields such as 
security and foreign policy, among others. The wide range of the TEU intentions, 
contemplating not only the setting of new provisions on the mentioned areas, but also 
amendments to the EEC, ECSC and Euratom treaties, made it a highly complex 
document. It is therefore common to describe it as a set of three pillars, in order to 
simplify its structure: the first, concerning the economic activity of the union; the 
second pillar including common foreign and security policy; and the third, 
contemplating justice and home affairs, which in turn includes several issues, such as 
police cooperation, immigration affairs, fraud combat and others. 
The fall of the former Soviet Union was also an important factor in some of the 
structural changes included in the TEU, since it was common belief among the 
members that the fall would imply, with time, an increasing number of applications to 
EU membership, and the members did not believe that the EU previous structure was 
prepared to deal with that eventuality. It later became clear that the members’ 
predictions were accurate, since from 1991 to 2007 the EU members’ number increased 
from 12 to 27.  
The TEU also addressed other vital issues for the union. The most significant was 
the commitment to finish the EMU until the end of the decade. In order to assure that 
the EMU was accomplished, several conversion criteria – also known as Maastricht 
criteria – were set. These criteria, to be met by any country wanting to join the EMU, 
were: 
 
• Each country’s inflation could not be more than 1½ percentage point higher 
than the average of the three members with lower inflation rates. 
• Long-term interest rates should be within 2 percentage points of those same 
countries. 
• In the same period, members should keep their exchange rates within the 
bands defined in the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), with no stress or 
devaluation. 
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• Budget deficit to GDP ratio should be under 3%, and the ratio of government 
debt to GDP should be under 60%. In certain pre-defined cases however, 
infringements were allowed. 
• Finally, an independent central bank was also mandatory.  
 
 A Cohesion Fund was created in order to transfer funds to the less developed 
members. EU’s infrastructures, consumer protection rules, industrial policy, among 
other matters, were also addressed in the TEU. In the end, the TEU represented an 
enormous leap for the EU, with significant institutional reforms and the definition of 
deadlines for the ambitious EMU project. Those profound changes were symbolically 
embodied in the union’s new name: the Economic European Community was now the 
European Union. 
 
2.2.4 The Amsterdam Treaty and the Growth and Stability Pact – 1996 
The next treaty to be signed in the EU, the Amsterdam Treaty (1996/97), was more 
modest in its contribution for the European integration process, when compared to its 
predecessors. There were even difficulties with its ratification in Denmark, France and 
the UK. Nonetheless, it was an important step towards new levels of integration. It 
included an employment chapter in its provisions and also environmental, public health 
and consumer protection policies following the “mad cow disease” burst in the 
precedent years. Improvements on common foreign and security policies were also 
made.  
One year before, in 1995, the EU became a 15 members union, with the entrance of 
Austria, Finland and Sweden. 
Economists will probably remember the year of 1996 most for the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP), a decisive step which guaranteed that members’ behaviour 
regarding their economies was convergent and prudent enough to guarantee the full 
realization of the EMU in the deadline defined at the TEU. 
The SGP enforced two particular Maastricht Criteria: the 3% limit for the budget 
deficit to GDP ratio, and the limit of 60% for the national debt to GDP ratio. It 
contemplated fiscal monitoring, warnings and sanctions for those who were not able to 
respect those limits.  
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The limits for the budget deficit and national debt deeply influence members’ fiscal 
policy autonomy. For instance, they diminish governments’ ability to intervene in the 
economy, since members are unable to significantly increase public expenditure if they 
are already too close to those limits. This kind of actions can be particularly relevant in 
times of recession. By taking away these policy instruments from national governments 
the EU becomes more responsible for members’ economic outcomes, since national 
governments can argue that the worsening of its country’s economy is a consequence of 
its inability to intervene in the economy due to the limits set by the TEU. This relates to 
the purpose of my thesis, since I intend to study if EU citizens are aware that higher 
levels of integration implicate more power of the EU over its members, their economic 
policies and ultimately also their economic outcomes. 
In order to be closely monitored by the European Commission (EC), members were 
required to deliver annual stability/convergence programmes. In these documents, 
members should demonstrate they will adopt, in the next four years, fiscal policies that 
comply with the SGP objectives. In case of disagreement about the policies undertaken 
by a member, the commission might either issue a warning or recommend specific 
procedures. If a member fails to keep the budget deficit under 3%, Excessive Deficit 
Procedures (EDP) may be implemented, which the member state should strictly follow. 
In case the member does not comply in due time with the measures recommended in the 
EDP, it can be subject to warnings and, eventually, sanctions by the EC. 
 
2.2.5 The European Monetary Union - 1999 
The convergence criteria defined in the TEU regarding matters such as budget 
deficits, government debt, inflation, interest rates or exchange rate stability were 
considered fundamental to assure the necessary economic convergence between 
members that intended to participate in the EMU.  
The Convergence Report (1998) accessed to what extent did those members meet 
the criteria previously defined. In the end, when the Council of Ministers established 
which countries met the criteria and which did not, significant departures from the 
previous established criteria were allowed, specially regarding the debt to GDP ratio. 
The strong will of those in power, with the help of high levels of flexibility in the 
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interpretation of the convergence criteria allowed the Euroarea3 to be born on January 
1st 1999, when all exchange rates between state members were fixed according to the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). Denmark, Sweden and the UK were the only 
members at the time that did not share the will to join the Monetary Union. Therefore, 
the UK negotiated an “opt-out” from the Maastricht Treaty, Denmark subjected its 
decision to a popular referendum, which rejected the participation in the EMU, and 
Sweden deliberately failed to meet the convergence criteria in time. 
The Euro only entered people’s pockets in 2002, but after the 1st January 1999, the 
EMU was a reality. This was undoubtedly a great achievement in the history of 
international economic and political cooperation. This also implied that nation members 
ceased to have any saying in their monetary policy besides their representation in the 
European System of Central Banks (ESCB), lead by the European Central Bank (ECB). 
Without entering into the discussion about the advantages and disadvantages of the 
monetary union, one thing is obvious and consensual: the monetary union stripped its 
members of some of their power to manage and/or manipulate their national economies, 
by taking away their authority over monetary issues. This comes as a more important 
feature when we take into consideration that a significant part of economic theory sees 
monetary policy as an important and powerful tool to intervene in the economy. 
Later in 2004 the EU took an important step in the healing process that had been 
going on since the early nineties and the fall of the Berlin Wall, allowing for 10 
different countries4 to simultaneously join the EU, and in the process extending its 
border until Russia, what some years before would seem politically too risky. 
 
From a common market for a few selected products, with only six countries, to a 
union with a directly elected parliament by twenty seven countries5, the EU walked an 
enormous distance in its integration process. Such a process inherently stripped EU 
members of some of their powers in the most varied fields, with the economy being of 
particular significance. Regarding the economic integration process in particular, we can 
thus identify four phases: The first, with a common market spreading between the late 
sixties and the mid-eighties; the second phase after the signing of the SEA (1986) , 
                                                 
3
 Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Nederlands, Portugal and 
Spain joined the Euroarea from the beginning, in 1999. Greece followed in 2001. Further additions for the 
Euroarea were Slovenia (2007), Cyprus and Malta (2008) and finally Slovakia (2009). 
4
 Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia 
5
 Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU in 2007.  
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paving the way to a more convergent path for all the members; the third phase, 
beginning with the signing of the TEU (1991) and the decision to go ahead with the 
EMU, confining countries economic actions to the convergence criteria; and the last 
phase, starting with the implementation of the monetary union, in the beginning of 
1999.  
My premise in this dissertation is that, given the transfer of competences from the 
EU members to the EU institutions, citizens’ approval of EU should depend on 
good/bad national economic performances. 
 
2.3 The European Union’s Structure 
After the fourth enlargement in 1996, the EU had a combined population of close to 
370 million people, ruled by 15 different national governments. In order to assure 
effective economic integration between interests that aren’t always convergent, the EU 
has to rely on its institutions and on its legal basis. The EU has five main institutions: 
the European Commission (EC), the European Parliament (EP), the European Court of 
Justice, the European Council and the Council of Ministers. While the first three are 
independent supranational entities, the latter two are composed by governments’ 
representatives, being therefore totally dependent on state members’ interests and 
actions. Each institution has different levels of authority and competences that make 
them all essential to the effectiveness of the European integration process: 
 
• The EC is responsible for proposing and mediating negotiations regarding 
legislation, as well as for the management of the technical implementation of the 
union’s policies. It also has the responsibility of representing the EU in 
international negotiations, defending its interests. Finally, the EC has also to 
ensure that EU laws and recommendations are followed within its members’ 
territories. 
• The EP has the power to reject legislation in certain policy areas. The EP can 
also, under predetermined circumstances, call the EC and the Council of Ministers 
to report their actions to it. In extreme scenarios, the EP has also the power to 
dismiss the EC, although this has never been done. 
• The European Court of Justice is responsible for judging all matters concerning 
the EU law. 
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• The Council of Ministers is composed by ministers of all state members. Each 
meeting is attended by the ministers responsible for the subject to be discussed. 
Each country holds the presidency of the council for a rotating period of six 
months. 
• The European Council is composed by the heads of state and foreign ministers 
of each member, as well as by the EC president and vice-president. It is 
considered to be the most important and influential institution within the EU, 
since it is responsible for the more important political and strategic decisions. 
 
There are also a number of other institutions that should be mentioned when we talk 
about the power the EU has over its members. The ECB, created in 1999, is responsible 
for all monetary policy decisions among the members of the EMU. The Economic and 
Social Committee is composed by interest groups, and it is consulted in most economic 
policy decisions. The TEU created a Committee of the Regions, aiming at involving 
subnational governments in EU’s regional policy. There are also a great number of 
lobbies that substantially influence the EU’s decisions and the EC’s in particular. The 
openness of the EC to those pressures is in part consequence of the fact that the EC 
doesn’t have any agencies in the field, and therefore is forced to rely on such lobbies to 
gather relevant information for its activities and decisions.  
If we take into account the authority and responsibilities of each of the EU’s 
institutions, we can have an approximate idea of the impact that the EU’s decisions may 
have on each members’ economy. I rely on that impact to support my prior that 
economic conditions have an influence on people’s opinion about the EU. The 
following section presents a literature review on studies that used economic conditions 
and other factors to explain the support for the European integration process. 
  
2.4 The Support for European Integration 
Ever since the creation of the EU, researchers have tried to figure out what causes 
citizens’ opinions about it to vary over time and across countries. Nonetheless, 
researchers are not the only ones interested in understanding the EU’s popularity 
mechanics. They aren’t probably even the ones more interested in it. Since the union’s 
early days, member states’ governments have been the main deciding forces behind the 
integration process’s evolution. To this day, the European Council is still in charge of 
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all important strategic decisions regarding the EU’s future. Assuming that governments 
are interested in staying in office for as long as their national constitution allows them to 
be – taking a page out of the political business cycle literature – it is likely that they will 
only support an increase in the EU’s levels of integration as long as they believe that 
their voters will support it as well. With this being said, we can argue that public 
opinion about the EU is a decisive factor when the union decides to move forward in its 
integration process. 
Different kinds of factors can influence the EU’s popularity variation, from political 
and institutional features to economic and historic conditions. According to Lindberg 
and Scheingold (1970), in the early days of the European integration process, the first 
six members’ citizens supported the process through what they called a “permissive 
consensus”, since there was a generalized feeling of trust from the EU’s population on 
the political elites that drove the process. Although there is a high level of agreement in 
the literature about this explanation for the evolution of the public opinion about the EU 
in its first two decades, a series of more significant steps towards higher levels of 
integration, namely the SEA (1986), the TEU (1992) and the start of the EMU (1999), 
made public opinion to diverge from the so called “permissive consensus” to a more 
active and critique stance towards the EU. This greater level of awareness of the EU 
citizens’ was patent on the outcomes of the referendums on the TEU held in Denmark 
and France, and the results of the EU membership referendums held on Austria, Sweden 
and Norway, with Norwegians actually rejecting becoming part of the EU.  
Several factors have been pointed by the literature as having a significant impact on 
the public support for the EU and its integration process. For presentation purposes, I 
will divide them into economic and non economic related theories. This will allow for a 
better focus on those works that use approaches closer to the one I use in this 
dissertation. 
 
2.4.1 Non-Economic Factors 
 Starting in the seventies with Ingleheart’s (1970) paper, a stream of literature from 
authors such as Hewstone (1986), Ingleheart et al. (1991) and Janseen (1991) has 
postulated that individual values influence citizens’ attitudes towards the EU. They 
argue that the EU represents an idea of integration and unification towards a more 
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egalitarian system that should be more appealing to the so called postmaterialists than to 
the materialists. 6 
The same group of authors also argued that since the European integration process 
lead to a supranational political figure (the EU) that was highly abstract, individuals had 
to have high levels of cognitive mobilization in order to fully understand the scope of 
the EU. Therefore, individuals with higher levels of political knowledge who can 
understand the full range of the European integration process with less difficulty should 
be more supportive of the EU than the less informed ones. 
According to Ingleheart et al. (1991), Wessels (1995) and Budge, Robertson and 
Hearl (1987), class partisanship can also play an important role in shaping individuals’ 
opinion about the EU. According to their argument, left parties have been more critical 
of the European integration process since the beginning because they see it mainly as a 
further step to consolidate the capitalist model, which they don’t support. 
There are also some researchers who believe that the most important determinant of 
EU’s popularity is the support levels for each national government. This belief comes 
from the fact that the biggest reforms and policy decisions within the EU are negotiated 
by the heads of state, and therefore citizens may use their governments’ domestic 
performances as a proxy by to access the EU’s performance. This is reinforced by the 
idea that the EP’s elections are seen by Europeans as second order elections. As argued 
by Reif and Schmitt (1980), Reif (1984) and Marsh (1998) voters still use domestic 
government’s performance as the main indicator of European performance. Franklin, 
Van der Eijk and Marsh’s (1995) study of the French, Irish and Danish referenda 
concluded that in all the three cases the government’s popularity at the time of the 
referendum was an important explanation of referendum’s outcome, further supporting 
the hypothesis that citizens may use national governments’ performances as proxies for 
the EU’s performance. 
 
It should be noted that most studies listed above rely on relatively small samples and 
econometric results that are not very robust. Therefore, in order to draw definitive 
conclusions more research on these topics is necessary. 
 
                                                 
6
 Materealists are individuals who value physical and economic well-being above everything else, while 
postmateralists value factors such as self-esteem, integration and intellectual fulfilment. 
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2.4.2 Economic Factors 
If we take into account that together with peace-keeping, economic growth was the 
main motivation behind the creation of the EU (or the ECSC in its early days), it should 
come as no surprise that European citizens expect EU membership to improve their 
countries’ economic performance and/or their personal financial situation. Therefore, 
economic conditions are likely to have an impact on people’s opinions about the EU. In 
order to verify the existence and magnitude of such an impact, two different approaches 
can be taken. 
The first approach looks at the costs and benefits associated with EU membership 
for each citizen as an individual. Gabel and Palmer (1995) and Gabel (1998) developed 
a utilitarian model to explain individuals’ levels of support for the European integration 
process. According to their argument, such divergence in opinions about the EU is a 
consequence of the heterogeneity of individuals’ socio-economic situations. They argue 
that trade liberalization increased competition among EU members, making individuals 
with higher stocks of human and physical capital more likely to benefit from the EU’s 
common market, and thus more supportive of the European integration process. The 
same authors also argue that geographic location can influence citizens differently, with 
citizens living nearer borders with other EU countries benefiting more from market 
liberalization within the EU, thus being more supportive of the European integration 
process as well. Multivariate analysis from Gabel and Palmer (1995) and Anderson and 
Reichert (1996) confirm the influence of education, occupational skills, income and 
proximity to EU borders on citizens’ support for the European integration process. 
Nonetheless, these works once again lack controls for alternative explanations, thus 
casting some doubt on the robustness of their conclusions.  
The other approach to the impact of economic conditions on the EU’s popularity is 
closer to the analysis undertaken in this thesis, and studies the aggregate–level dynamics 
of public support for the EU. Based largely on the literature on VP-functions, this 
approach was first introduced by Eichenberg and Dalton (1993). The argument behind 
this stream of research is that since the EU, like national governments, has an important 
role on defining economic policy for its members, it is also held responsible for 
variations in economic outcomes. Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) use national 
macroeconomic outcomes to explain variations on the EU’s popularity, that they 
measure using data from the Eurobarometer’s (EB) questionnaires.  In this pioneer 
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study, only inflation is found to have a statistical significant effect on people’s opinion 
about the EU. This conclusion would be later reinforced by Anderson & Kaltenthaler 
(1996), although these authors also find a negative and statistical significant relationship 
between unemployment and the EU’s popularity. Their results also show that GDP 
growth is statistically significant when the dependent variable used is the support of 
integration in general, which is basically the same dependent variable used in all models 
of this thesis. Mahler, Taylor and Wozniak (2000), in their study of the economic 
determinants of public support for the EU, found that, at a national level, inflation is 
statistically significant related with the EU’s support, while neither the unemployment 
rate nor GDP growth are found to be statistically significant, thus supporting 
Eichenberg and and Dalton’s (1993) results. 
Most authors that believe non-economic factors to be the main determinants of the 
EU’s popularity disagree with this point of view, stating that citizens have limited 
knowledge about their countries’ economies – as shown by Paldam & Nannestad (2000) 
for the the Dannish case – which casts doubt in the assumption that national economic 
conditions have an impact on citizens’ support for the EU. Nonetheless, if citizens know 
little about the economy, it is likely that they form their opinions about it from the 
perception they have of it, either from their personal experience and the experiences of 
those close to them, or from the media and other information vehicles. If they do so, 
then it is likely that broader measures of economic performance such as inflation, 
unemployment rates and GDP growth rates are the best proxies for their perception of 
their countries’ economic performance available to us. 
 
3. Dataset 
The dataset used in my estimations comprises data from 1974 to 2008, for the first 
15 EU members7. The panel constructed is not balanced given the differences in data 
available for each country. Notice that EB questionnaires are only conducted in each 
country after that country joins the EU.  
 
                                                 
7
 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
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3.1 Eurobarometer Data 
EB are public opinion surveys conducted on all EU countries since 1973, two times 
per year. These questionnaires are used to access public opinion in the EU about a 
variety of topics, such as EU’s policies and institutions, religion and politics.  Each 
observation is based on a different random sample, making relations at an individual 
level impossible to analyze. Each EB survey is followed by a Standard Report, 
presenting the main results from the conducted surveys and its analysis. 
The composition of the EB has changed significantly over time. Although 
demographic and individual related questions have remained unchanged since the first 
EB, other questions were only asked in a smaller number of EB. Nevertheless, some 
questions besides the ones regarding aspects such as individual’s personal 
characteristics have also been asked in virtually all the EB. This is the case of the 
question I intend to use as a proxy for EU’s popularity – Question 1 in Table 1 – which 
has close to seventy observations for the first six EU members. This question has been 
asked from EB No 1 to the last EB for which the Standard Report is available, with only 
minor changes in its phrasing.  
Table 1 presents a list of the questions for which I retrieved the data, the answers 
available to the respondents as well as the indexes computed for each of them. The 
number of observations for each question and the dates of the first and last EB on which 
they were asked are also presented in the same table. To all of these questions, the 
respondents who answered “Don’t know” were discarded, and the other answers’ 
percentages were recalculated as percentages of all the respondents with an actual 
opinion. After that operation, three different indexes were computed for each variable, 
in order to obtain a single value for country i at time t. 
Graphic 1 displays citizens’ support for the EU between 1974 and 2008, in four 
different countries, using question 1’s index 1. There are significant disparities among 
EU’s popularity over time, in the four countries. These disparities in the support for the 
EU among state members are most likely a consequence of the different repercussions 
that EU’s policies have in each of them, caused by the political, economic and social 
framework of each country. Moreover, economic shocks across the union are not 
perfectly symmetric, which implies that policy decisions by the EU are unable to satisfy 
the needs of all countries. Therefore, the same EU policy can have different impacts on 
member states’ economies, and ultimately in each citizen’s opinion about the EU. 
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Figure 2 - The EU’s popularity 
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Table 1 - Questions’ Description 
 
Question Answers Indexes Max Obs. per country First Obs. Last Obs. 
1. Generally speaking, do you think that 
your country’s membership of the EU is: 
a) A good thing; 
b) A bad thing 
c) Neither good or 
bad 
Index 1 = a + 0,5c 
Index 2 = a – b 
Index 3 = a - 0,5c - b 
70 
EB No 1 
April  
1974 
EB No 70 
November 
2008 
2. How do you think the general economic 
situation has change over the last twelve 
months? 
a) Got a lot better; 
b) Got a little better; 
c) Stayed the same; 
d) Got a little worse; 
e) Got a lot worse; 
Index 1 = a +0,5 b  
Index 2 = 5a + 4b +3c + 2d +e 
Index 3 = (a + 0,5b) – (e + 0,5d) 
 
14 
EB No 18 
October 1982 
EB No 42 
December 
1994 
3. Compared to twelve months ago, do you 
think the financial situation of your 
household, now is…? 
a) A lot better; 
b) A little better; 
c) The same; 
d) A little worse; 
e) A lot worse; 
Index 1 = a + 0,5b  
Index 2 = 5a + 4b +3c + 2d +e 
Index 3 = (a + 0,5b) – (e + 0,5d) 13 
EB No 18 
October 1982 
EB No 40 
November 
1993 
4. What are your expectations for the year to 
come, when it comes to your country’s 
economy? 
a) Better; 
b) Same; 
c) Worse; 
Index 1 = a + 0,5b 
Index 2 = a – c 
Index 3 = a – 0,5b –c 
23 
EB No 46 
November 1996 
EB No 70 
November 
2008 
5. What are your expectations for the year to 
come, when it comes to your household’s 
financial situation? 
a) Better; 
b) Same; 
c) Worse; 
Index 1 = a + 0,5b 
Index 2 = a – c 
Index 3 = a – 0,5b – c 
 
23 
EB No 46 
November 1996 
EB No 70 
November 
2008 
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3.2 Economic Variables 
As far as the economic variables are concerned, quarterly data on exports, imports 
and GDP was gathered from the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) International 
Financial Statistics (IFS). Inflation, unemployment rate and private consumption series 
were taken from the OECD Economic Outlook statistics, except for the unemployment 
rate series for Belgium, Denmark, France and the UK, which were taken from the 
Eurostat statistics. Private and government consumption data was also collected from 
Eurostat’s statistics database. Data on the trade volume with other EU countries was 
gathered from the AMECO database. The EU’s budget figures were taken from the 
Court of Auditors Annual Reports. Both values for intra EU trade and the EU budget 
are only available in an annual basis. Therefore, the values retrieved were divided by 
two in both cases in order to obtain approximate values for each semester. In every 
model specification, all other economic variables are measured as two-quarter averages. 
The degree of openness of the economy (DOE) was calculated according to the 
following formula: 
 
 
where itIMP is the level of imports of country i in year t, itEXP is the level of exports 
for the same country, in the same period, and itGDP is the gross domestic product for 
that country at that time.  
Data on the European Parliament Elections, the Excessive Deficit Procedures and 
the entrance date of each member was retrieved from the European Union’s official 
website.8 
Summary statistics for all the variables are presented in Table 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 http://europa.eu/ 
itititit GDPEXPIMPDOE /)( +=
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Table 2 - Summary Statistics 
  
  Units No Obs. Mean Stand Dev. Min. Max. 
Popularity Index 1 Units 855 74,368 12,449 36,170 94,388 
Popularity Index 2 Units 855 48,725 24,891 -27,660 88,776 
Popularity Index 3 Units 855 36,441 27,706 -39,362 85,204 
Inflation Percentage 1.038 0,014 0,014 -0,004 0,089 
GDP Growth Rate Percentage 841 0,013 0,033 -0,124 0,150 
Unemployment Rate Percentage 857 0,074 0,042 0,012 0,243 
Unemployment Growth Rate Percentage 842 0,012 0,118 -0,226 0,807 
Degree of Openness of the Economy Percentage 845 0,783 0,477 0,290 3,307 
Percentage of Trade with EU countries Percentage 966 0,644 0,090 0,382 0,855 
Private Consumption 
Percentage of 
GDP 734 0,536 0,075 0,160 0,765 
Government Consumption 
Percentage of 
GDP 754 0,211 0,038 0,078 0,308 
Honeymoon effect (2 Years) Discrete 1.050 0,066 0,426 0 4 
European Parliament Elections Dummy 1.050 0,086 0,280 0 1 
Excessive Deficit Procedures Dummy 1.050 0,043 0,203 0 1 
Membership Length Semesters 1.050 36 28 0 94 
Economy Previous Year Index 1 Units 147 -17,171 23,319 -71,717 28,342 
Economy Previous Year Index 2 Units 147 266,046 46,738 156,566 359,684 
Economy Previous Year Index 3 Units 147 13,934 8,728 1,042 36,413 
Household Financial Situation Previous Year 
Index 1 Units 140 -9,541 13,414 -51,010 14,283 
Household Financial Situation Previous Year 
Index 2 Units 140 281,090 26,953 197,980 331,566 
Household Financial Situation Previous Year 
Index 3 Units 140 11,396 4,674 2,020 26,263 
Economy Next Year Index 1 Units 311 -13,534 23,364 -63,291 50,000 
Economy Next Year Index 2 Units 311 41,205 6,975 22,727 66,447 
Economy Next Year Index 3 Units 311 -33,866 21,097 -77,848 31,895 
Household Financial Situation Next Year Index 
1 Units 315 9,436 14,311 -74,648 40,909 
Household Financial Situation Next Year Index 
2 Units 315 34,894 5,880 20,833 56,250 
Household Financial Situation Next Year Index 
3 Units 315 -18,947 13,363 -80,282 21,591 
Source: IMF, Eurostat, OECD, AMECO, Eurobarometer, European Comission   
 
Looking at Popularity Index 1, which will be used as the explanatory variables on 
most estimated models along this thesis, we conclude that the EU’s citizens see their 
countries’ membership of the EU generally as a good thing, since this index may vary 0 
and 100, and its mean is close to 75. Inflation’s mean (under 1,5%) is a clear signal that, 
on average, inflation remained at low levels across the sample. Unemployment however 
presents more worrying values, that in the end imply that, on average, almost 7,5% of 
the EU’s population was unemployed between 1974 and 2008. EU countries show 
disparities in their degrees of openness of their economies, with values raging between 
29% and 331%. From the total trade considered in the calculations for the DOE, around 
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64% on average respects trade with other EU countries, which is proof of the 
importance of the EU’s common market. 
Although the economic performances of EU members are expected to converge, 
especially in later stages of the economic integration process, there are still significant 
asymmetries between members’ economic outcomes. Graphic 2 illustrates those 
differences by presenting the evolution of unemployment rates in four EU members 
over the last four decades. 
 
Figure 3 – Unemployment Rate 
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4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1 The Generic Empirical Model 
Since the purpose of my thesis is to evaluate how economic conditions influence 
EU’s popularity, the following generic popularity function will be estimated: 
 
ititititit uYXLPOPPOP ++++= −− 312110 ββββ                 (1) 
 
In this function, itPOP  stands for EU’s popularity index in country i, at time t and 
iLPOP  represents lagged values of the EU’s popularity. Vector 1−itX  represents a set of 
variables that measure economic performance. Different lags of both the dependent 
variable and economic variables will be tested, in order to assure that the correct 
specifications are used. 
Although economic outcomes are expected to influence the EU’s popularity, there 
are other non-economic variables that may have a significant impact on it. Vector itY  
comprises those variables, mostly dummies, aimed to capture issues such as honeymoon 
effects, the impact of EP’s elections, the effect of EDP or the length of each country’s 
membership of the EU. 
The honeymoon effect represents a state of grace that the EU may enjoy in a country 
after it joins the EU. This is based on the assumption that after a country enters the EU 
its citizens are overjoyed with the fact that they are now members of the EU. In the 
model, this can be analyzed by creating a dummy variable assuming positive values for 
the first semesters after each country enters the EU, and zero in the remaining periods. 
For instance, if we consider it to last two years, the dummy variable will have the value 
of 4 for the semester when the country joins the EU, 3 for the second, 2 for the third 
semester and 1 for the fourth semester after the entrance. Different lengths will be tested 
in order to access how long the honeymoon lasts. I expect this variable to have a 
positive coefficient on my estimations. 
It would also be interesting to test if when EP elections are held, citizens pay more 
attention to the EU actions and policies, and if this has an impact on its popularity. 
Therefore, a dummy variable was created with value 1 for each semester when EP 
elections are held and 0 otherwise. 
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The convergence criteria set in the SGP, in 1996, established that countries not 
complying with the public debt to GDP and budget deficit to GDP ratios would be 
subject to an EDP, under the coordination of the EC. Given the restrictive nature of the 
EDP, it is expectable that when governments are forced to follow them, they will blame 
the EU for its negative short-run consequences. Therefore, when countries are under the 
EDP, it is likely that EU’s popularity diminishes. To study this effect, a dummy variable 
was created, assuming value 1 whenever a country is under EDP, and zero for all 
remaining periods. 
The variable regarding membership length assumes a value corresponding to the 
number of semesters that each country has been a member of the EU. For instance, if at 
a given moment, one country as been a member of the EU for twenty years, the variable 
will have a value of 40. I expect this variable to present a negative sign, following the 
same assumption that was presented earlier for the honeymoon effect. Furthermore, 
citizens from older members may not be enthusiastic about the more recent members, 
particularly if those countries are economically weaker and will compete for the EU 
budget’s transfers. 
 
4.2 Econometric Issues 
The specification of my empirical model and the dataset structure previously 
presented may originate several econometric issues that must be taken into 
consideration while choosing the most suitable econometric method for the estimations. 
I will start by estimating the regressors by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). Even though 
later econometric procedures may prove that OLS isn’t the best estimation method 
given the dataset and the empirical model, its results will serve as a benchmark for the 
other models. 
One of the problems that may arise when applying OLS to a panel data-set is that its 
estimations may be biased if unobserved individual effects are statistically significant. 
Figure 3 show that there are significant differences between members’ average 
popularity over the whole period, suggesting this is an issue that should be taken into 
account. 
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Figure 4 – Average Popularity Index 1 
 
 
One way to address the problem is to use a fixed effects model. The fixed effects 
model assumes the existence of correlation between the error term and the regressors.  
This is an intuitively compelling idea in this framework, since each country has its own 
historic, social, economic, political and institutional characteristics that are likely to 
have a permanent, significant influence on its economic performance as well as on its 
citizens “affection” for the EU. Another model that can be used to address the problem 
of unobserved heterogeneity is the random effects model. This model assumes that there 
is a country specific effect, but that this is somehow random. This effect has no 
correlation either with the regressors or with the error term. It is less likely that this is 
the case in my empirical model. Nonetheless, I intend to perform the Haussman test in 
order to test if the extra orthogonality conditions imposed by the random effect model 
are valid. If they are, it means the regressors are uncorrelated with the error term, and 
therefore the fixed effects model turns out to be consistent but inefficient whereas the 
random effect model is consistent and efficient. If, on the contrary, the Hausman test 
results point to the existence of correlation between the error term and the regressors, 
the random effects estimator will not be consistent, and the fixed effect estimates will be 
consistent and efficient. 
There is also evidence that the EU’s popularity is persistent over time. This is taken 
into account in the model by including lags of the dependent variables as explanatory 
variables. This dynamic nature of the panel may bring up some estimation issues itself. 
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Specifically, the estimation for the lagged dependent variables in the fixed effects model 
tend to be negatively biased in a dynamic panel framework, while the OLS estimators 
become positively biased. A first-differences model could be an alternative for this 
problem, but it would generate a case of correlation between the lagged dependent 
variable and the error term that would cause the OLS estimators to be strongly 
negatively biased.  
Another alternative would be to use a system GMM estimator, which overcomes 
both the problems from the fixed effects and the first differences models, and it is 
appropriate to be used in cases where there is significant persistence of the dependent 
variable. However, the system GMM model is better suited for datasets with large 
number of individuals (N) and small number of periods (T), which is not the case in this 
sample. Since the fixed-effects model’s negative bias is larger when there is a small 
number of periods and a large number of individuals in the sample, this bias won’t be as 
severe in my estimations as it would be in other data frameworks. Therefore, as long as 
the results support it, I will use the fixed-effects estimation method as my main 
econometric framework throughout this dissertation. 
 
4.3 Popularity Functions for the EU 
A Haussman test was used to choose between the random effects and the fixed 
effects model. Results firmly rejected the null hypothesis that the error terms are not 
correlated with the regressors, suggesting the existence of country specific effects. As a 
robustness test, the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test was also used. The 
null hypothesis is that variance across countries is zero, which means that there is no 
significant differences across countries. Results of the test once again confirm the 
inappropriateness of the random effect models, rejecting the null hypothesis. 
A Fisher test for panel unit root using an augmented Dickey-Fuller test was 
performed in order to access whether the series concerning the dependent and the main 
economic variables were stationary or not. The advantage of this test, when compared 
with other alternatives on unit root testing in a panel data framework, is the fact that it 
can be performed in an unbalanced panel, while most of the other similar tests can’t 
(Maddala and Wu, 1999). All tests rejected the null hypothesis of the existence of a unit 
root, therefore proving all series to be stationary. The only exceptions are the degree of 
openness of the economy and the percentage of trade with other EU countries that 
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appear to have unit roots. Since in my model’s specification these variables are used as 
control variables, I will not dwell too much on their unit root. Moreover, it would be 
expectable that on most countries they would increase over time as globalization in 
general, and the European integration process in particular, move forward. 
 
4.3.1 The Impact of Economic Performance 
The results of my first estimations are presented in Table 3. Two different 
estimation methods were used: OLS and fixed effects. Each popularity index was used 
as dependent variable on OLS and fixed effects estimations. All models share the same 
explanatory variables in order to make comparisons more straightforward. 
 
Table 3 - Estimation Results 
  
Index 
1 
  
Index 
2 
  
Index 
3 
  
Index 
1 
  
Index 
2 
  
Index 
3 
  
  OLS   OLS   OLS   
Fix. 
Eff.   
Fix. 
Eff.   
Fix. 
Eff.   
Popularity (-1) 0,707 *** 0,707 *** 0,704 *** 0,624 *** 0,623 *** 0,619 *** 
 (16,92)  (16,95)  (16,95)  (14,51)  (14,51)  (14,53)  
Popularity (-2) 0,221 *** 0,222 *** 0,224 *** 0,149 *** 0,150 *** 0,151 *** 
 (5,36)  (5,38)  (5,46)  (3,49)  (3,52)  (3,56)  
Inflation (-1) 0,344  0,702  0,824  -0,053  -0,083  -0,096  
 (1,30)  (1,33)  (1,37)  (-0,15)  (-0,12)  (-0,12)  
Unemployment Rate Growth Rate (-
1) -5,087 *** -10,200 *** -11,700 *** -4,137 ** -8,290 ** -9,620 ** 
 (-2,58)  (-2,58)  (-2,59)  (-2,05)  (-2,06)  (-2,09)  
GDP Growth Rate (-1) 3,770  7,930  6,470  2,504  5,400  3,840  
 (0,52)  (0,54)  (0,39)  (0,35)  (0,38)  (0,23)  
Degree of Openness of the Economy 
(-1) 0,380  0,750  0,959  3,484 * 6,880 * 8,510 * 
 (0.,93)  (0,92)  (1,03)  (1,76)  (1,74)  (1,88)  
Trade with the EU (-1) 1,758  3,580  4,360  8,270 * 16,500 * 20,200 * 
 (0,68)  (0,69)  (0,74)  (1,84)  (1,84)  (1,96)  
Membership Length -0,001  -0,002  -0,005  -0,075 *** -0,148 *** -0,182 *** 
 (-0,16)  (-0,15)  (-0,26)  (-3,60)  (-3,57)  (-3,83)  
Constant 3,587 ** -0,038  -1,570  12,110 *** 1,460  -3,350  
 (2,12)  (-0,01)  (-0,39)  (3,62)  (0,23)  (-0,46)  
R - Squared 0,907   0,908   0,905   0,859   0,860   0,850   
Observations 530  530  530  530  530  530  
Countries 15  15  15  15  15  15  
Fixed Effects N/A   N/A   N/A   Yes *** Yes *** Yes *** 
Obs: t statistics in brackets. Significance level for which the null hypothesis is rejected: *** 1%, ** 5% and *10%; for all Fixed Effects Models, 
Prob > F = 0, proving the existence of Fixed Effects. 
 
Results presented in Table 3 for the six estimated models have some common 
features. First, all fixed effects estimations’ results reject the null hypothesis that the 
dummies for each country are jointly insignificant. Therefore, the fixed effects model is 
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preferable to the OLS when it comes to studying the impact of economic outcomes on 
the EU’s popularity. Another important feature in Table 3’s results is that the EU’s 
popularity shows strong persistence over time, with the sum of  the estimated 
coefficients for the first two lags being around  0,80 in all models. Note that the indexes 
have different scales: index 1 varies between 0 and 100, while indexes 2 and 3 vary 
between -100 and 100. It should also be noted that regardless of the index used as 
dependent variable, the R-squared, the t-statistics and the significance level of each 
variable do not vary considerably. I will from now on focus my interpretation on the 
models that use index 1 as the dependent variable because, in my opinion, its 
coefficients are easier to interpret than the others, given theirvalues’ range (0 to 100). 
As long as the economic variables are concerned, the unemployment rate growth in 
the previous semester is always statistically different from zero for a 1% confidence 
level. The unemployment rate growth’s coefficient on both the OLS and the fixed 
effects model is close to minus 5, which suggests that when unemployment doubles, the 
EU’s popularity (index 1) falls around 5 points. If we take into account that popularity 
index 1 varies between 0 and 100, we can conclude that the impact of the 
unemployment rate growth’s variations on EU’s popularity is not very strong. 
Nonetheless, its negative sign follows my initial expectations, implying that an increase 
in a country’s unemployment hurts EU’s popularity. As expected, citizens hold the EU 
partially responsible for their country’s economic performance. 
From the other economic variables, the percentage of trade with EU countries and 
the DOE are also statistically significant in all fixed effects estimations for a 10% 
confidence level. Both variables have positive coefficients, suggesting that the EU is on 
average more popular in countries that trade more, particularly with other EU countries. 
None of the other economic variables tested are statistically different from zero. 
However, the coefficients for inflation have always the expected negative sign. Results 
concerning GDP growth also follow my initial expectations, with its positive coefficient 
pointing to a positive relation between economic growth and support for European 
integration.  
Finally, the variable that represents the length of each country’s membership is 
statistically significant at the 1% confidence level and negatively signed, suggesting that 
as time goes by the EU’s popularity decreases. It appears that countries that have been 
members of the EU for longer periods of time tend to be less supportive of the EU.  
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It is important to mention that other economic variables were tested in the baseline 
model, such as private and government consumption as a percentage of the GDP, and 
the net benefit from the EU budget averaged by the GDP. Since none of them was close 
to being statistically significant in any of the models, they were excluded from the 
estimations presented throughout the thesis. 
 
4.3.2 Country Specific Effects 
Although a fixed effects’ estimation is equivalent to adding N-1 dummy variables to 
an OLS regression, in reality it allows for every single individual in the sample to have 
its own constant term. The model does so by creating an additional dummy which is 
constrained to be equal to zero, thus allowing the existence of a constant coefficient for 
each individual, which should be compared to zero, as suggested by Suits (1984). The 
results presented in Table 3 indicate that there are significant individual (country 
effects) for a 1% confidence level. This was expectable, since each country has different 
features, both economic and historic, that have a permanent and very strong impact in 
its economy at any time. Table 4 presents the specific effect coefficient for each 
country, according to the fixed effects model’s estimation that excludes the variable 
concerning membership longevity, since this variable may capture some of the country 
specific effect associated with the timing of each country’s entrance to the EU, and I am 
interested in analyzing the whole specific effect at this point. 
 
Table 4 - Country Specific Effects 
Country Fixed Effect 
Austria -3,0596 
Belgium 1,4682 
Denmark -1,2198 
Finland -2,9567 
France -0,1139 
Germany -0,1475 
Greece -0,1859 
Ireland 2,6593 
Italy 0,6779 
Luxembourg 3,8753 
Netherlands 2,6594 
Portugal 0,4224 
Spain 0,8166 
Sweden -2,9325 
United Kingdom -3,2821 
Source: IMF, Eurostat, OECD 
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From the six EU founding members, only Germany and France present negative 
coefficients. It would be expectable that the nations that were in the origin of the union 
would be the ones that would support it the most. This is true for the other four 
founding members. In spite of that, for both France and Germany the estimated 
coefficients are very close to zero, meaning that they are still more supportive of the EU 
than other countries that joined the union later on. 
There are great differences between the 1973 entrants’ public opinion about the EU. 
UK’s reluctance to fully embrace the EU has been evident ever since it began 
negotiating its entrance. This was even clearer when the country chose not to join the 
EMU in the early nineties. The negative coefficient of its country specific effects 
confirms UK’s scepticism about EU membership, and was expected beforehand. 
Denmark, another of 1973’s entrants, was also one of the countries that preferred not to 
join the EMU on its free will. The popular referendum that rejected the EMU is a clear 
sign of Danish people’s opinion about the EU, and this is visible in Table 4 as well. The 
other member that joined the EU in 1973 however, has a totally different perspective. 
After a long period of economic growth, especially in the nineties, Ireland received the 
nickname of the Celtic Tiger, an analogy to the Asian tigers that had great spells of 
economic growth years before, through relatively similar economic strategies. It is 
likely that Irish people see the economic growth and the policies behind it as a partial 
consequence of their membership of the EU, especially the access to larger markets, an 
essential pillar of Ireland’s economic growth strategy. Therefore, the large positive 
coefficient presented for the country is not a big surprise as well. 
Greece, the solo entrant of 1981, presents a negative coefficient that might be 
attributed to the fact that the country has been unable until today to accommodate the 
rigor associated with EU’s policies and regulations. This became more visible when it 
was proved that the Greek government had deliberately manipulated public statistics in 
order to assure that the country was able to join the EMU. The fact that the EU was 
unable to notice this in due time, as well as the lack of ability of the country to deal with 
problems such as corruption and inefficiency in the public sector even after it joined the 
EU, can probably explain the negative coefficient of this country specific effect, 
although its magnitude is not as severe as in other countries. 
In the opposite scenario we find Portugal and Spain that joined the EU in 1986. 
Both countries enjoyed great spells of growth after joining the EU. The smaller 
coefficient from Portugal can be a consequence of the economic downturn the country 
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has suffered since the late nineties, while Spain kept growing at relatively steady rates, 
thus presenting a higher coefficient. 
The three most recent members, Austria, Finland and Sweden, joined the union 
in 1995, and they all present negative coefficients. The fact that the EU is not very 
popular among their citizens may be due to the fact that these countries were already 
countries with strong economic performances when they joined the EU, and didn’t 
observe significant improvements after joining the EU, and therefore feel that there 
were no significant benefits from giving up a significant part of their autonomy to the 
EU. 
 
4.3.3 Dummy Testing 
In order to test the impact of the EP elections and the EDP in the EU’s 
popularity, and to check if there is evidence of a honeymoon effect in a country’s 
population after that country joins the EU, Table 5 presents the estimation for three 
models that include vector itY  presented before in equation (1). Each one of the models 
has different length for the honeymoon effect: in model 1, the effect lasts two years, in 
model 2 it lasts three years, and finally, model 4 considers it to last four years.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 41 
Table 5 - Dummy Testing Results 
      
  2 Years HE   3 Years HE   4 Years HE   
  
Fixed 
Effects   
Fixed 
Effects   
Fixed 
Effects   
Popularity (-1) 0,614 *** 0,617 *** 0,618 *** 
 (14,26)  (14,30)  (14,33)  
Popularity (-2) 0,155 *** 0,151 *** 0,150 *** 
 (3,63)  (3,53)  (3,50)  
Inflation (-1) 0,008  0,005  -0,002  
 (0,02)  (0,01)  (-0,01)  
Unemployment Rate Growth Rate (-1) -3,642 * -3,623 * -3,573 * 
 (-1,80)  (-1,78)  (-1,76)  
GDP Growth Rate (-1) 3,562  3,364  3,326  
 (0,49)  (0,47)  (0,46)  
Degree of Openness of the Economy (-1) 2,875  2,972  3,010  
 
(1,44)  (1,48)  (1,50)  
Trade with the EU (-1) 9,785 ** 9,282 ** 9,031 ** 
 
(2,14)  (2,02)  (1,97)  
Excessive Deficit Procedures -0,701  -0,712  -0,717  
 (-1,05)  (-1,06)  (-1,07)  
European Elections -0,518  -0,516  -0,536  
 (-0,95)  (-0,95)  (-0,98)  
Honeymoon Effect 1,205 ** 0,477 * 0,264  
 (2,43)  (1,69)  (1,43)  
Membership Length -0,063 *** -0,063 *** -0,063 *** 
 (-2,86)  (-2,86)  (-2,85)  
Constant 11,318 *** 11,680 *** 11,790 *** 
  (3,28)   (3,35)   (3,36)   
R - Squared 0,868  0,866  0,866  
Observations 530  530  530  
Fixed Effects Yes *** Yes *** Yes *** 
Obs: t statistics in brackets. Significance level for which the null hypothesis is rejected: *** 1%, ** 5% and *10%; for all Fixed 
Effects Models, Prob > F = 0, proving the existence of Fixed Effects. 
 
All three models suggest that there isn’t a statistically significant impact of the EP 
elections on the EU’s popularity, which could imply that citizens don’t change their 
opinion about the EU in periods when information about the union is more easily 
available, particularly through the media. EDP’s relation with the EU’s popularity is not 
statistically significance as well, although its p-value in the three models is close to 0,2. 
Its coefficient points towards a negative relationship between EDP’s and the support for 
the EU, implying that some of the short-run restrictive consequences of the EDP may be 
considered the EU’s fault. There is also evidence of the existence of the so called 
honeymoon effect in the first three years after a country joins the EU. This effect is 
stronger in the first two years, although it is also statistically significant for the first 
three years, for a 10% confidence level.  The coefficient regarding the honeymoon 
effect is not statistically different from zero when we consider it to last four years. This 
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is a signal that in the first three years after a country joins the EU its citizens are filled 
with a sense of euphoria that translates into a positive bias towards the EU that fades 
away after three years. 
 
4.3.4 Time Evolution 
The European integration process was slow and progressive. It took more than half a 
century for the union to reach the level of integration experienced by its members today. 
During this period, not only the levels of economic integration changed, but the 
economy changed as well. When this is taken into consideration, it is not expectable 
that the way citizens incorporate economic conditions on their opinions about the EU 
has remained unchanged along its history. In order to study how the different levels of 
economic integration changed the way citizens incorporated economic outcomes in their 
opinions about it, I split the sample into three different periods, taking into 
consideration the two most important changes in the EU’s integration levels: 
• 1974 – 1987 (13 years): The first period goes from the beginning of my sample 
until the coming into effect of the Single European Act, whose consequences for 
the European integration process have been discussed previously in section 2.2.2. 
• 1987 – 1993 (6 years): This second period starts with the end of the previous 
period and ends with the coming into effect of the Treaty of the European Union 
and the definition of the convergence criteria (for more detailed information, see 
section 2.2.3). 
• 1994 – 2008 (14 years): The last interval of time begins with the coming into 
effect of the TEU, and extends until the end of my sample.  
 
A case could be made for the division of the last period into two, with a first period 
going from the TEU until the beginning of the EMU, and the second beginning with the 
EMU and extending itself until the end of my sample. However, it should be noted that 
before the start of the EMU its members were already bounded to the convergence 
criteria since the TEU. Furthermore, such division would lead to smaller samples and 
reduce the degrees of freedom in the estimations.  
Summary statistics for each period concerning the more significant economic 
variables used in the model are presented in table 6. 
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Table 6 - Summary Statistics by Period 
  
1974-1987 
            
 Units No Obs. Mean Stand Dev. Min. Max. 
Popularity Index 1 Units 280 74,24 13,88 36,17 92,71 
Inflation Percentage 399 2,50 1,60 -0,42 8,92 
Unemployment Rate Percentage 233 6,76 4,50 1,23 21,43 
Degree of Openness of the Economy Percentage 259 0,59 0,22 0,29 1,52 
Percentage of Trade with EU countries Percentage 351 0,59 0,09 0,38 0,78 
1987-1993       
 Units No Obs. Mean Stand Dev. Min. Max. 
Popularity Index 1 Units 154 81,11 9,20 54,21 94,39 
Inflation Percentage 193 1,23 0,95 -0,02 5,47 
Unemployment Rate Percentage 182 7,97 4,68 4,45 22,95 
Degree of Openness of the Economy Percentage 156 0,64 0,28 0,36 1,43 
Percentage of Trade with EU countries Percentage 175 0,68 0,07 0,54 0,80 
1994-2008       
 Units No Obs. Mean Stand Dev. Min. Max. 
Popularity Index 1 Units 421 71,98 11,57 40,53 92,55 
Inflation Percentage 446 0,59 0,37 -0,30 2,92 
Unemployment Rate Percentage 442 7,53 3,66 1,80 24,25 
Degree of Openness of the Economy Percentage 430 0,95 0,58 0,41 3,31 
Percentage of Trade with EU countries Percentage 440 0,68 0,07 0,55 0,86 
Source: IMF, Eurostat, OECD       
 
 
After splitting the sample into the mentioned periods, I estimated a model very close 
to model 4 from table 3, with the only difference being that I used only one lag of the 
dependent variable as explanatory variable instead of two, due to the smaller size of the 
new samples. The estimation results are presented in table 7. 
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Table 7 - Sample Division 
      
  1   2   3   
  1974-1987   1987-1993   1994-2008   
Popularity (-1) 0,200  0,617 *** 0,627 *** 
 (1,54)  (6,76)  (13,75)  
Inflation (-1) -1,116 * 0,875  -1,136  
 (-1,75)  (0,83)  (-1,39)  
Uneployment Rate Growth Rate (-1) -1,274  -13,470 * -4,014  
 (-0,28)  (-1,85)  (-1,56)  
GDP Growth Rate (-1) -3,821  -3,833  4,323  
 (-0,13)  (-0,15)  (0,52)  
Degree of Openness of the Economy (-1) -21,010 ** 8,772  4,092 * 
 (-2,39)  (0,72)  (1,65)  
Trade with the EU (-1) 31,720 ** 6,673  15,050 * 
 (2,44)  (0,31)  (1,71)  
Membership Length -0,072  0,023  -0,007  
 (-0,29)  (0,15)  (-0,21)  
Constant 61,130 *** 18,250  13,450 ** 
  (3,96)   (1,44)   (2,19)   
R - Squared 0,197  0,776  0,823  
Observations 66  97  368  
Number of countries at the period's 
beginning 9  12  15  
Fixed Effects Yes *** Yes   Yes *** 
Obs: t statistics in brackets. Significance level for which the null hypothesis is rejected: *** 1%, ** 5% and *10%; for all 
Fixed Effects Models, Prob > F = 0, proving the existence of Fixed Effects. 
 
The first conclusion that can be taken from Table 6 estimations is that, as expected, 
economic variables present different coefficients and statistical significance levels in the 
different periods analysed, proving that the way economic factors  affect citizen’s 
opinion about the EU has not been constant over time. 
Beginning with the first period analysed, we can observe that inflation, the DOE and 
the percentage of trade with other EU countries are all statistically significant. The 
lagged dependent variable is close to being statistically significant (p-value of 1,29), 
although its coefficient is significantly smaller than in previous estimations. This can be 
a sign that citizens’ opinion about the EU was not as persistent and stable in the early 
periods of the EU as it is now. The period between 1974 and 1987 is the only one where 
inflation is statistically significant. It is important to note that this period encompasses 
the two oil crises, and the high levels of inflation all over the world that followed them. 
Summary statistics for the three different periods in table 6 show that the average 
inflation during this period was two times bigger than the one observed in the next 
period, and four times bigger than the average inflation of the last period. This is 
probably proof that the EU’s citizens worry more about inflation when its levels are 
 45 
relatively high, and that they stop incorporating it in their opinion about economic 
performance when it stabilizes at lower levels. Similar to the inflation’s case, the DOE 
is also only statistically significant in this first period. Its negative coefficient can most 
likely be attributed to the repercussions in the world economy of the two oil crises too. 
Since open economies are more vulnerable to exogenous shocks, it is likely that as the 
damages from the two oil shocks started to be felt, with worse consequences for the 
more open economies, citizens started to believe that high degrees of openness of their 
countries’ economies were an undesirable characteristic because they made them more 
vulnerable to exogenous shocks. Results suggest that, for this period, an increase of 1 
point in the DOE reduced the EU’s popularity around 21 points. On the contrary, the 
percentage of trade with EU countries shows a large positive coefficient for this period, 
what is probably a sign that at this time, EU citizens considered the increase in the trade 
with other EU countries one of the most important and positive aspects of their 
countries’ EU membership. 
During the second period, which extends itself between the second half of 1987 
until the end of 1993, we observe significant changes in the estimations results. We see 
a higher level of persistence on citizens’ opinion about the EU, patent in the higher 
coefficient of the lagged dependent variable, which is now statistically significant for a 
1% confidence level.  Inflation is no longer statistically significant, as its levels 
stabilized in the end of the 80’s at low levels, close to those observed before the two oil 
crises. On the contrary, the higher unemployment rates that followed the two oil crises 
didn’t disappear after the effects of the crises wore off, as it happened with inflation. It 
might be the case that only after realizing that the higher unemployment levels that 
followed the two oil shocks were not just a temporary state but a permanent one, did 
citizens start considering it a problem worth worrying about, and thus the negative, 
statistically significant coefficient the unemployment rate growth presents in this second 
period. The lack of statistical significance of the DOE can be a proof that, after the oil 
shocks consequences dissipated, individuals realised that higher DOE’s were not such a 
negative reality. Whether it was a consequence of the evolving and growing European 
integration process itself, or a result of a broader process of globalization, remains to be 
determined, but it is likely that both realities played a role in this change of attitude. 
Neither the percentage of trade with other EU countries nor the GDP growth are 
statistically significant as well in this period. 
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The last period’s estimation results continue to support most of my interpretation of 
the results concerning the two previous periods. We can see a slight increase in the level 
of persistence of the lagged dependent variable probably as a sign of stabilization of 
citizens’ opinion about the EU. Inflation and GDP growth are not statistically 
significant in this period. The unemployment rate’s growth rate is very close to being 
statistically significant, with a p-value of 1,2. Both the DOE and the percentage of trade 
with other EU countries are statistically significant in this period for a 10% confidence 
level, and both have positive signs which means that in this period, the EU citizens view 
trade in general, and with EU countries in particular, as a positive consequence of their 
EU membership. The lack of statistical significance of GDP growth in all models 
estimated so far may be an indication that individuals have more difficulty in observing 
variations on GDP growth than they have in observing unemployment variations for 
instance.  
Although my main focus has been on the different coefficients and degrees of 
statistical significance of each of the independent variables in the models reporting to 
the different periods considered, there is also another aspect of the results that must be 
analyzed. The R-squared coefficient is very small on the regression for the first period, 
when compared to any other regression estimated so far. In the second period this 
coefficient is bigger, and finally, in the last period it reaches values close to those 
presented in the previous estimations that considered the sample as a whole. There are 
some possible explanations for this fact. First, there can be some significant economic 
variable that was not accounted for in the first period, which doesn’t seem very likely 
since I have used the more common variables present in the VP-function literature as 
proxies for countries’ economic performances. It may also be possible that in the early 
days of the EU, ideological and political factors had a more important role than 
economic outcomes in people’s opinions about the EU, leading to the “permissive 
consensus” first mentioned by Lindberg and Scheingold (1970). A higher volatility of 
those opinions in the early days of the EU may also play a role in this behaviour by the 
R-squared coefficient, since the coefficient for the lagged dependent variable grows 
bigger as time goes by, implying that in the early periods of the EU citizens’ opinion 
about the EU was not as stable and persistent as it is now. However, the most likely 
scenario is that this evolution of the R-squared coefficient in this particular case is 
mostly caused by the fact that the first two periods have less then than one third of the 
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observations of the last period, which causes the first two periods’ estimations to have 
less explanatory power than the last period’s estimations have.  
 
4.4 Additional Questions 
The VP-Function literature is rich not only in the number of publications, but also 
on the number of questions it raises about citizens’ behaviours. Given the questions’ 
data recovered from the EB’s Standard Reports, some of these questions can be targeted 
by my analysis in this thesis. Questions 2, 3, 4 and 5 (See Table 1) ask EU citizens their 
opinions about past and future scenarios for both their countries’ economies and their 
households’ financial situations. If we use these questions as explanatory variables for 
the EU’s popularity, we can try to shed some light over two of these questions: (1) are 
European citizens egotropic or sociotropic in their assessment of their countries’ 
membership of the EU?; and (2), are citizens more influenced by past events, or by what 
they expect will happen in the future when they evaluate their countries’ EU 
membership? The following sections will address these two questions, using the set of 
variables generated by the indexes created from answers data to the questions presented 
in table 1. 
Since questions 2 and 3, and questions 4 and 5 were present in exactly the same EB, 
I will estimate two different equations, one with data regarding questions 2 and 3, and 
one with data from questions 4 and 5, in order to lose as few observations as possible.  
Both estimated models presented in table 8 include only one lag of the dependent 
variable, in order to lose only one observation in each regression. This procedure is 
validated by .the results of the test for serial correlation for panel data (Wooldridge, 
2002) which didn’t reject the null hypothesis that there was no first-order 
autocorrelation. 
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Table 8 - Additional Questions 
    
  1   2   
  Q 2 & 3   Q 4 & 5   
Popularity (-1) 0,654 *** 0,584 *** 
 (7,00)  (13,03)  
Country's Economy Previous Year Index 1 0,055    
 (0,68)    
Household Fin. Sit. Previous Year Index 1 0,159    
 (0,77)    
Country's Economy Following Year Index 1   -0,022  
   (-0,46)  
Household Fin. Sit. Following Year Index 1   0,217 *** 
   (3,08)  
Degree of Openness of the Economy (-1) 12,517  4,713 * 
 (1,21)  (1,74)  
Trade with the EU (-1) 25,979  18,12 ** 
 (1,35)  (2,02)  
Excessive Deficit Procedures -  -0,772  
   (-1,00)  
European Parliament Elections 0,449  -1,829 *** 
 (0,38)  (-2,72)  
Honeymoon Effect (2 Years) 0,753  -  
 (0,78)    
Membership Length -0,099  -0,085 ** 
 (-0,70)  (-2,32)  
Constant 2,975  12,010  
  (0,21)   (1,61)   
R - Squared 0,687  0,747  
Observations 85  284  
Periods (Semesters) covered 13  22  
Maximum countries 12  15  
Fixed Effects Yes ** Yes *** 
Obs: t statistics in brackets. Significance level for which the null hypothesis is rejected: *** 1%, ** 5% and *10%; 
for all Fixed Effects Models, Prob > F = 0, proving the existence of Fixed Effects. 
 
The results from model 1, which includes measures for previous year’s economic 
performance and household situation, indicate that neither past households’ financial 
situations nor past country’s economic conditions influence individuals opinion about 
the EU. None of the other variables is statistically significant. When it comes to the 
analysis of expected scenarios for both the national economies and households’ 
financial situation in the following year (model 2) the results are different. The expected 
evolution of the household’s financial situation is statistically significant to a 1% 
confidence level. On the contrary, the expected evolution of the country’s economy isn’t 
statistically significant, with its coefficient presenting an unexpected negative sign. 
These results imply that individuals only take into consideration the impact of the future 
EU actions in their personal financial situation when they make their opinions about the 
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EU. This shows that, when looking at the future, European citizens are egotropic when 
they analyse their countries’ membership of the EU. This result goes against the so 
called “Kinder and Kiewiet result” from the PBC literature, since it indicates the 
existence of egotropic nature on citizens’ evaluation of the EU and the inexistence of a 
sociotropic component in that evaluat ion, while most PBC literature finds strong 
evidence of sociotropic behaviour in economic voting and little to no evidence of 
egotropic behavior. Nonetheless, previous estimations have shown that the growth rate 
of the unemployment rate has a statistically significant impact on the EU’s popularity 
and this is mainly a sociotropic variable. Therefore, it might be possible that the lack of 
statistical significance of the sociotropic variable in this model is a consequence of the 
reduced number of observations and is not due to a lack of citizens’ concern for the 
macroeconomic situation of the country. Additionally, there is evidence in model 2’s 
results of a positive influence of the DOE and of the percentage of trade with EU 
countries on the EU’s popularity, and also that the increase on information available in 
semesters when elections for the European Parliament are held has a negative impact on 
that same popularity. The length of membership is still statistically significant, with a 
negative coefficient relatively close to the ones found in previous estimations. 
The comparison between the results from model 1 and model 2 has to be made with 
caution, since it relies on the comparison between two equations that use two different 
data sets: model 1’s explanatory variables report to a period between 1982 and 1994, 
and has 130 observations while model 2’s explanatory variables has 306 observations 
that go from 1996 to 2008. But still, the result indicates that Europeans’ assessment of 
their countries’ membership of the EU is based at least more on their expectations for 
the future than in past events, giving the support for the European integration process a 
prospective nature. Again, this conclusion is less robust than the one concerning 
individuals’ egotropic nature due to the differences between the two data used in each of 
the equations, that differ even in the number of countries included in each of them, since 
the data used on model 3 doesn’t include Portugal, Spain, Austria, Finland and Sweden 
in some of its observations. 
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5. Conclusion 
The purpose of my dissertation is to analyze the determinants of the support for the 
EU in the past four decades. Understanding the variations of the EU’s popularity is 
important because it influences the EU’s and its members’ decisions to move forward to 
higher levels of integration. One should not expect member states’ governments to 
support higher levels of integration if they are not supported in that decision by their 
electorate since governments are always interested in being re-elected, according to the 
PBC literature. Therefore, more than researchers, the EU and its members have a need 
to know what determines the EU’s popularity. 
According to the literature on the support for the EU, there are different factors that 
may influence citizens’ opinion about the EU, from individuals’ values to aggregate 
economic performance, from countries’ geographical positions to individuals’ socio-
economic conditions. I focus my analysis on the impact of macroeconomic outcomes on 
the EU’s popularity, although other factors are also taken into account throughout my 
estimations. One of the most predominant arguments behind the European integration 
process since its early days is that it would allow, through its common market and 
centralized policy making decisions, to improve its members’ economic conditions. 
Therefore, it is plausible to assume that the EU’s citizens expect EU membership to be 
associated with better economic performances. Taking a page from the PBC literature, if 
governments are held responsible for economic outcomes, why shouldn’t the EU be 
held responsible as well, given it has taken away national governments’ authority over 
some economic policy decisions? 
The dataset used in my estimations comprises observations for the first fifteen EU 
members, from 1974 until 2008. The EU’s popularity was measured using data from the 
EB’s surveys, which ask the same question about the EU’s membership since 1974, thus 
allowing for a consistent measure of the support for the European integration process 
for all the period considered. In order to control for each country’s specific historical, 
economic and social background, a fixed effects estimation method was used. This 
method allows the model to control for the existence of correlation between the error 
term and the regressors. 
Among the economic explanatory variables, the unemployment rate’s growth rate 
has a negative and statistical significant impact on the EU’s popularity throughout the 
whole sample while the DOE and the percentage of trade with other EU countries are 
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statistically significant, but have a positive impact on the citizens’ support for the 
European integration process. The variable that represents each country’s longevity in 
the EU is statistically significant in all estimations, always with a negative sign. 
 
There is also evidence of the existence of a honeymoon effect between the EU 
members and the union in the first three years of membership. Inflation fails to be 
statistically significant in all the models that consider the whole longitudinal sample 
dimension, which comes as surprise since it is the only variable that is statistically 
significant in almost all empirical estimations in the literature that takes a aggregate 
approach to explain the support for the EU. However, the results become a little clearer 
when the sample is split into three periods, using the SEA (1986) and the TEU (1993) as 
the breaking points since I consider them to be the two major leaps in the European 
integration process. The different results presented by each variable in these periods, 
both in their coefficients and in their levels of statistical significance, are proof that EU 
citizens’ opinion has not been affected the same way by each variable along the period 
analysed. 
Additionally, country specific effects’ coefficients meet my expectations, with the 
EU being more popular in the first six members and in the members that had greater 
spells of economic growth after joining the EU (Ireland, Portugal and Spain). 
Finally, using four questions to ask respondents their opinions about past and future 
scenarios for both their countries’ economies and their households’ financial situations, 
I find evidence of egotropic behaviour by citizens when they evaluate their countries’ 
EU membership based on their expectations for the future.   
As interesting and relevant my dissertation’s conclusions might be, especially 
considering it is the first time to the best of my knowledge that the impact of aggregate 
economic conditions on the EU’s popularity is studied for such a large sample, there is 
still research that can be made to improve it. For instance, it would be interesting to 
expand the number of controls to the political realm, in order to have a better 
understanding of all the main determinants of the EU’s popularity, and not only the 
economic ones. One could also try to estimate vote/popularity functions for national 
governments in the same period, to analyze if the EU’s increasing levels of integration 
lead citizens to held national governments’ less accountable for their countries’ 
economic outcomes.  
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